By  Jessie Tougas
University of British Columbia

“In today’s Russia…[many] live in the closet, because even if they did manage to abolish all the oppressive laws, they would still face widespread homophobia…. Confronting that is a much bigger task….” —Milene Larsson (qtd. in VICE)

In 2014, sociologist Laurie Essig wrote that “[t]he depth of homophobia[1] in Russia apparently knows no bounds,” citing violent remarks such as a former Orthodox priest’s desire burn homosexuals alive. Such remarks are not completely alien to Americans; they might remember when James David Manning, a New York City pastor, suggested that people who promote homosexuality should be stoned, and erected a sign outside his church saying, “Jesus would stone homos…Stoning is still the law” (Malone 2014). It is perhaps because of this familiarity that Western media and queer activists tend to concentrate their outrage not on religious homophobia in Russia, but instead on the country’s homophobic laws, policies, and politicians. In particular, the Kremlin’s vague outlawing of “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations to minors” has drawn considerable attention, and has been blamed for causing or condoning an increase in homophobic vigilantism (Gliha 2015, Luhn 2013, MacKinnon 2014a, MacKinnon 2014d, Stella 2014). Likewise, anthropologists and other scholars have focused on queer politics in Russia without exploring in depth its intersection with religion. In my research, I have found this intersection to be important in understanding the specific context of the “queer situation” in Russia. Specifically, the Russian Orthodox Church has uniquely close ties to the Kremlin and plays a vital role in Russian national identity unmatched by its counterparts in the West. Meanwhile, Western faith-based organizations have supported anti-queer efforts in Russia both financially and politically.

Russia’s “Gay Panic”

            The swift and ferocious spread of laws targeting queer Russians has prompted some scholars to refer to the political situation as a “moral panic” or “gay panic” (Essig 2014, Wilkinson 2013). But this panic is not limited to politicians; ordinary citizens are also responding with intolerance, hatred, and violence. When Putin passed the “gay propaganda law” in June 2013, a Kremlin-operated polling agency announced that 88% of Russians supported the law, and 54% believed homosexuality should be criminalized (Manson 2013). Even before the law was passed, independent pollsters revealed that 74% of Russians said “homosexuality should not be accepted by society,” and almost two-thirds found it “morally unacceptable and worth condemning (Mirovalev 2015, Reilly 2013).

At the same time, reports of homophobic violence and vigilantism in Russia are on the rise. In 2013, three men raped and murdered a young man with whom they were socializing “[b]ecause he said he was gay” (BBC 2013). The victim was sodomized with several beer bottles and his skull was crushed by a large stone (Barry 2013). A month later, another man was stabbed and murdered “because he was gay” (Gutterman 2013). Human Rights Watch (2014) has gathered accounts from 78 victims of homophobic violence in 16 different cities across Russia. Queer activists are met with violence every year they participate in Moscow Pride, which has been called an annual “gay-bashing ritual”; Masha Gessen (2013), a prominent activist, explained: “We show up, they beat some of us up, and the next year we show up again—just to prove that we will keep showing up.” In light of the 2014 Olympics, some queer Russians have noted that it’s easier to be “out” in Sochi than in other parts of Russia, but they still get attacked on the street (MacKinnon 2014d). Gay clubs are raided by anti-gay vigilante groups, which are emerging across Russia under names like “Occupy Gerontophilia” and “Occupy Paedophilia,” the latter of which is an enormous network “active in over 30 Russian cities” (Gliha 2015, Luhn 2013, Steele 2014). While the internet used to be one of the only safe spaces for queer Russians, it has now been infiltrated by vigilante groups who feign queerness in order to lure gay men to a place where they can abduct them and abuse them (Human Rights Watch 2014, Luhn 2013; Steele 2014). Hundreds of attacks have been filmed by the vigilante groups themselves and uploaded online in an acknowledged effort to expose their victims and “ruin their lives” (Human Rights Watch 2014, Luhn 2013; Steele 2014). Occupy Paedophilia calls this affair a “safari,” and victims call themselves “the hunted” (Steele 2014). The whole situation is rightly called a “crisis.”

And yet, authorities do little to prevent violence, protect victims, and investigate these cases. Human Rights Watch (2014) noted in their report that the police did little or nothing to protect the victims or investigate their cases, and Steele’s (2014) interviewees made similar remarks about their own situations. Despite being sanctioned by the European Court of Human Rights, Moscow Prides have been denounced by the mayor as “satanic” and officially banned until 2112 (Wilkinson 2013, Gessen 2013). Reports of unsanctioned Prides claim the police maintain a double standard: they fail to protect queer protestors from violence and often detain them, while letting the counter-protestors go free (Gessen 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014, Stella 2013). And though vigilante groups often publicize their identities and actions, authorities refuse to investigate and prosecute them (Human Rights Watch 2014). Some argue that because these groups can act with impunity, the vigilantes believe that their violence is supported by the government (Steele 2014).

Beyond this, several Russian politicians even go so far as to deny the claims of homophobic persecution. In 2013, St. Petersburg MLA Vitaly Milonov, who helped author the “gay propaganda law,” claimed that the reports of homophobic violence is “fake,” “a foolish story” and “not true,” but rather that “much violence goes from gay people to straight people” (Aravosis 2013). Before the 2014 Winter Olympics, Mayor Anatoly Pakhomov claimed that there are no homosexuals in Sochi (Urback 2014), despite the fact that it has been called the “gay capital of Russia” (MacKinnon 2014d). The implications of his claim are obvious: without homosexuals, how can there be homophobic violence? Moreover, in reaction to criticism from the UN General Secretary and the International Olympic Committee, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak insisted that the “gay propaganda law” does not discriminate based on sexual orientation because it applies to everyone equally (MacKinnon 2014c, Wilson 2013). Putin defended the law by saying it is “no infringement on the rights of sexual minorities,” and simultaneously blaming Europe’s population decline on legalizing gay marriage (Berry 2013). Finally, Vladimir Yakunin, President of Russian Railways, declared that “it is just a trick to say that gays are suppressed—it is not true. It is just not true” (Miles 2015). Yakunin, a billionaire, helps finance his wife’s Sanctity of Motherhood program, which attempts to solve “the crisis of traditional family values” by promoting anti-abortion and anti-queer legislation (Levintova 2014).

Queer Russia’s Historical Context

            It is important to remember that the West is not immune to homophobic persecution. The FBI reported 1,572 victims of hate crimes targeting their sexual orientation in the U.S. in 2011, making up 20.4% of total hate crimes and second only to racial targeting (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2011). In Canada, violent hate crimes are more likely to be motivated by sexual orientation than any other category, including race (Statistics Canada 2008-2012). Moreover, two Yale Law professors have pointed out that variations of “gay propaganda laws” exist in the U.S. as well (Ayres and Eskridge 2014). And recently, Indiana’s controversial Religious Freedom of Restoration Act resulted in a nation-wide boycott over the law’s potential to discriminate against queer people, while the law’s supporters argued that it doesn’t have that potential (McCann 2015). Shortly after, an Indiana pizzeria made headlines by refusing to cater a same-sex wedding for religious reasons, and has since received over $840,000 in donations (Rayman 2015).

Clearly, it would not be accurate to approach Russia’s “gay panic” from a Western holier-than-thou (or more-progressive-than-thou) standpoint, nor would it be very useful. International Relations scholar Cai Wilkinson (2013) has warned that “trying to explain why homophobia is currently so strong in Russia misses the point by suggesting that it is somehow ‘normal’ and inevitable, and that we cannot or should not expect any more from Russians.” However, ignoring the situation in Russia is not effective either; in fact, it does harm to the many queer Russians who suffer from homophobic laws and violence. Rather, it is useful to understand any particularities of homophobia in Russia in order to challenge it. Thus, when trying to grasp the unique historical trajectory that has led queer Russia to where it is today, it is important to remember that that history is contingent.

Dan Healey (2014), a scholar in modern Russian history, outlines a number of factors that led to a different evolution of Russian queer politics than that which occurred in the West, including the ideological separation from Europe and the U.S., the perception of homosexuality as a threat to population growth, KGB surveillance and entrapment, little private space during socialism, recent economic and political turbulence, and specific policies that inhibit queer organizing. Sociologist Laurie Essig (1999) contrasts the Western notion of queer identity with the Russian notion of queer subjectivity, which does not demand strict, conformist performance but also does not “work to change antisodomy laws nor psychiatric diagnoses nor gay bashing” (163). Brian James Baer (2009), a professor of Russian studies, notes that the “compassion” for homosexuality in Russian culture demands that queers endure suffering, celibacy, and smirenie, which Baer defines as a masochistic and “religious attitude of acceptance of one’s fate” (103, 118). This contradicts the Western image of queerness as politically active, pleasure-seeking, and sex-affirming; and while contemporary queer Russians seek to replace the former with the latter, they compete with xenophobia and deeply-rooted tradition (Baer 2009:118-119). Finally, sociologist Francesca Stella (2014) asserts that the recent homophobic laws extend from the “nationalist rhetoric about Russian traditions and values” which “is increasingly defined in opposition to…western influences” and includes “conservative family values and gender roles.” She argues that this is Putin’s tactic to increase the legitimacy of his presidency and government (Stella 2014). This may be especially important given his inauguration into a third term and his recent involvement in Crimea.

The Intersection of Religion and Queerness in Russia

            As I have shown, much of the work in this area by scholars, activists, and the popular press has focused on law and politics. Comparatively little attention is paid to the role of religion, and, in particular, the Russian Orthodox Church. But the intersection of religion and queerness in Russia does deserve attention; for example, as noted above, Russian queers are expected to endure suffering with the religious attitude of smirenie (Baer 2009). However, the intersection becomes even more conspicuous as I demonstrate how the Russian Orthodox Church is a key player in the recent movement against queerness.

As Christian denominations around the world take various positions on queerness, the Russian Orthodox Church firmly supports the notion that queerness is immoral and, moreover, that it is a threat to the Russian state (Essig 2014, Stan 2010). Speaking of same-sex marriage, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill said: “This is a very dangerous apocalyptic symptom, and we must do everything in our powers to ensure that sin is never sanctioned in Russia by state law, because that would mean that the nation has embarked on a path of self-destruction” (Russia Today 2013). It is perhaps not surprising to Westerners that a Christian denomination would consider queerness a sin. However, what is unique in this situation is the way that queerness has been positioned as antithetical to Russian nationalism. This positioning is based on three major claims about queerness that are used to justify anti-queer legislation, but each claim is unfounded.

First, queerness is portrayed as a foreign pollution and thus it is seen as part of the Western cultural imperialism that threatens Russianness (Baer 2009:7, Essig 2014, Stella 2013:471-2). This justifies the ban against queer organizations that receive Western funding as well as any queer activism or support that comes directly from Western countries (Stella 2013:471-4). However, this perception of queerness as a foreign pollution is grounded in the “disease model of homosexuality,” which posits that queerness is contagious, that it can infect anyone, and that it can spread widely throughout a population under the right conditions; and this model is unfounded (Essig 2014, e.g. Brakefield et al. 2014). Second, queerness is portrayed as an exacerbation of Russia’s low birth rate and thus poses a threat to the nation (Berry 2014, Healey 2014:95, Stella 2013:474-5). This claim is used by pronatalist and “pro-family” organizations, such as the World Congress of Families (WCF) and its Russian partners, to lobby against queer marriage (Levintova 2014). But the claim that queerness reduces national birth rates is also unfounded, since queers do reproduce even if, just like heterosexuals, much of their sexual activity does not result in a child (Boswell 1980:9-10). Third, queerness is portrayed as morally decadent and thus perceived as a threat to Russian social order (Essig 2014, Healey 2014:95, Stella 2013:471-472). This justifies the denial of official registration to queer organizations on “moral grounds” (Healey 2014:110). Specifically, queers are seen to threaten social order because they are assumed to be pedophiles; for example, Russian Orthodox clergy member Father Sergei said that “these things are interconnected; when gays are allowed, pedophilia will soon flourish” (Steele 2014; e.g. Aravosis 2013, Berry 2014). This, of course, is also unfounded (Groth and Gary 1982).

Perhaps unlike any one denomination in Western countries, the Orthodox Church holds great moral and cultural sway over the Russian population at large. According to recent polls, three-quarters of Russians identify as Orthodox Christians, and this number has risen since 1992 much more sharply than other confessions or non-believers (Levada 2013:145). Furthermore, over two-thirds of the Russian population generally approve of the Patriarch’s and the Church’s actions (Levada 2013:141). When asked “which role should the Church and religious organizations play in Russian public life,” the most popular response—in each of the 5 years the question was asked—was “support public morals and virtues” (Levada 2013:140). Moreover, when asked “how important it is to be Orthodox Christian to be a true Russian,” 69% responded “very important” or “important to a certain extent,” while only 27% responded “not too important” or “not important at all” (Levada 2013:18). Similarly, Minister of Culture Alexander Avdeev equated Russian culture and Orthodoxy when he asserted that “Russian culture will flourish and remain the center of the national idea only if it will be in very close dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church, if it is connected with the understanding that the spiritual and historical value are both sacred values” (Blitt 2011:375). It is perhaps for these reasons that Patriarch Kirill had to power to summon tens of thousands of people in Moscow to protest against the feminist and queer activists Pussy Riot (Berry 2012).

More evidence of the Orthodox Church’s influence in anti-queer efforts is that many people invoke the moral authority of Russian Orthodoxy while condemning queerness. For example, anti-queer protestors are often identified as Orthodox Christian groups who display icons and crosses while shouting religious slander against homosexuality and sometimes becoming violent (Gessen 2013, Human Rights Watch 2006, Manson 2013, Stella 2013:473). Ivan Okhlobystin, an actor and former Orthodox priest, publicly stated: “I would put all the gays alive into an oven. This is Sodom and Gomorrah! As a religious person, I cannot be indifferent about it because it is a real threat to my children!” (Kozlov 2013). Furthermore, in justifying the need for his “gay propaganda law,” Milonov stated:

As a person, I am profoundly against gay parades, because I am an Orthodox Christian and the demonstration of the sin of Sodom is repellent to me. If, God forbid, I happened to see a crowd of those citizens — like they do in Berlin, I’ve seen photographs where men with all sorts of dildos are running around semi-naked — it’s natural that I’d try to take my children aside, so that they would not see this perversion. (Chernov 2012)

The Mayor of Moscow, Iurii Luzhkov, also used religious moral authority to justify his ban against Moscow Prides (Stella 2013:471). Finally, politician Elena Mizulina, who sponsors anti-queer legislation like the “gay propaganda law” in the State Duma, heads the Duma Committee on Family, Women, and Children, which confers with Patriarch Kirill’s Commission on the Family, Protection of Motherhood, and Childhood (Levintova 2014). Clearly, when it comes to anti-queer efforts, the separation between church and state grows thin.

This phenomenon is possible because of the more general affiliation between the Orthodox Church and Putin’s regime. Before Putin was elected into his third, Patriarch Kirill publicly supported his presidency and called it a “miracle of God” (Bryanski 2012). In return, the Orthodox Church’s wealth has grown enormously with the Kremlin’s financial support (Pomerantsev 2012). Putin has helped rebuild over 23,000 churches with financial support from state-owned energy companies; he has also returned property to the Orthodox Church that had been seized by the Soviet Union, making the Church one of the largest landowners in Russia (MacKinnon 2014b, Pomerantsev 2012). Since 2009, the Kremlin has given Patriarch Kirill the power to review and make suggestions to all legislations proposed in the State Duma (Odynova 2009).

And yet, Russian public opinion seems to support this level of church-state alliance. According to a 2013 poll, almost the majority (48%) of respondents said that the Church has “just enough” influence “on the government’s policy in Russia,” while only 6% said it had “too much” (Levada 2013:140). When asked about the amount of government support that the Church receives, the most popular answer (45%) was that it “receives just enough support” that it should, while the least popular answer (14%) was that it “receives excessive support” (Levada 2013:141). Nonetheless, others are critical of Putin’s alliance with the Patriarch. For instance, it was the subject of Pussy Riot’s protest, and, fittingly, Russia’s secular courts prosecuted the band members by appealing to Orthodox canon law for the first time in modern Russian history, deeming their actions “blasphemous” (Ponomariov 2013).

However, the Russian Orthodox Church is not the only religious organization that politically and financially supports anti-queer activism in Russia; faith-based “pro-family” organizations from the West also help support both political and religious-cultural movements against queer rights. For example, Archpriest Dmitri, who heads the Patriach’s Commission on the Family, Protection of Motherhood, and Childhood, says the Commission’s “main [international] connection is the World Congress of Families” (Levintova 2014). WCF’s managing director, Larry Jacobs, spoke at the Sanctity of Motherhood inaugural conference in 2010 in the Moscow Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, expressing an alliance with Russia’s “traditional values” movement (Levintova 2014). The WCF planned to hold its own annual conference in 2014 in Moscow, but these plans were suspended because of logistical issues due to the “situation in the Ukraine and Crimea,” although the WCF made clear that “the suspension of planning is not meant to reflect negatively on the Russian people, churches or individuals who have taken a leadership role in the fight to preserve life, marriage, and the natural family at home and as part of the international pro-family movement” (World Congress of Families 2014). Jacobs has also conferred with Russian politician Mizulina, who sponsored the “gay propaganda law,” to write additional anti-queer legislation (Levintova 2014).

Interestingly, the WCF’s position in Russia—which it claims to be “active…since its founding in 2005”—reveals that Russian politicians and Orthodox leaders are open Western influence as long as it aligns with the “correct” views (Levintova 2014; World Congress of Families 2014). And even though the WCF is based in Illinois, it plays into Russian nationalist and anti-Western sentiments to bolster support for their “pro-family” activism. When announcing their suspension of their Moscow conference, the WCF wrote: “At a time when Western governments are moving backward to a pagan worldview, Russia has taken a leadership role to advance the natural family” (World Congress of Families 2014). Furthermore, the WCF’s involvement in Russia reveals how the West is implicated in Russia’s anti-queer movement.

Conclusion

            This article has demonstrated the apparent links between the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s “gay panic.” But in doing so, I have not intended to hold up the Church as a target on which to open fire. In a country that experienced state-led religious persecution for most of the 20^th century, religious freedom is an especially important right. Nor have I meant to imply that homophobic persecution is to be expected from Russians, or that Russia is democratically inferior to Western countries. Indeed, the West is neither free from homophobia nor innocent in the anti-queer crisis in Russia. But if we are to understand and challenge “the broader socio-political dynamics” that contribute to Russia’s “gay panic,” as Wilkinson (2013) argues, then we must appreciate the role that Russian Orthodoxy plays in the current social climate. As Milene Larsson suggested, it may be more difficult to eradicate systemic homophobia than institutional homophobia (VICE 2014). This article is but one step toward understanding and challenging the persecution of queerness in Russia; more research is needed to successfully overcome this persecution in Russia and around the world.

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2014   Robyn Urback: If it weren’t for all the gays, there would be no gay people in Sochi. National Post, January 28. http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/01/28/robyn-urback-if-it-werent-for-all-the-gays-there-would-be-no-gay-people-in-sochi/

Wilkinson, Cai

2013   Russia’s Anti-Gay Laws: The Politics and Consequences of a Moral Panic. The Disorder of Things, June 23. http://thedisorderofthings.com/2013/06/23/russias-anti-gay-laws-the-politics-and-consequences-of-a-moral-panic/

Wilson, Tom

2013   Russia defends anti-gay law in letter to IOC. Associated Press, August 22. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/russia-defends-anti-gay-law-letter-ioc

World Congress of Families

2014   Planning for World Congress of Families VIII Suspended. World Congress of Families Press Release. http://worldcongress.org/press-releases/planning-world-congress-families-viii-suspended

VICE

2014   Young and Gay in Putin’s Russia. Documentary. http://www.vice.com/video/young-and-gay-in-putins-russia-full-length-vice

[1] The term “homophobia” in this article is meant to encompass all forms of antipathy toward all sexual and gender minorities. Likewise, “queer” is used to encompass all of these minorities, while other terms (such as “gay” and “homosexual”) are used if citing others’ speech.